達賴喇嘛的新自治論 (2) @ 《系列．中國》

達賴喇嘛方面

達賴喇嘛需要反思他的策略。西藏流亡政府在國際上很成功，但中國國內對其充滿疑心而影響不大。西藏流亡政府試圖用走國際路線而令在政治上處於優勢地位的北京政府成為道德戰役的失敗者。這可從桑東仁波切（Samdhong Rinpoche）的聲明上反映出來，他說：「我們有自己獨特的強項，它能夠令我們在與中國談判時平起平坐。那就是我們擁有真理和和平，它令我們比中國更強大、更有力量。」 ¹²⁶國際上的成功使得很多政治家、文化體和非政府組織關切西藏流亡政府的處境，而遮掩了為擴大西藏自治權的政治真相。

達賴喇嘛應該採取漸進的戰略，¹²⁷從文化自治開始著手，然後才推進到其它自治的領域。有理由相信他是願意這樣做的。2004年，他表示為了解決西藏的問題，中國必須保存三樣事物：「西藏獨特的文化遺產、慈悲的靈性和優良的環境。」 ¹²⁸雙方應在發展西藏經濟上加強合作。一方面固守佛教徒超脫塵世的經濟思想是合理和有吸引力的，另一方面老是反對經濟發展的進程是徒勞的，¹²⁹連達賴喇嘛都認為「西藏人需要更加的繁榮，更大的物質發展。」 ¹³⁰

自治不是一蹴可就的，它有一個不斷探索和調整的過程。耐性才是取得進展的重要因素。通過幾次訪問就要消除五十年來的不信任是不可能的。由於美國中央情報局一直以來的參與，中國有理由懷疑西藏問題有國際化的趨勢以及西藏青年議會支持西藏獨立。給談判定下最終限期的類似行動都是徒勞的，因為期限過後若還沒有實際行動那只會證明定期限那方的效率低下。¹³¹最後，雙方都需要對激進派的制衡。只要溫和派掌握主動，就能夠使雙方朝著合作、互動的方向前進，從長遠來看和平解決西藏問題是有希望的。

北京方面

2005年1月，以達賴喇嘛為領導的西藏流亡政府增設了一個「談判工作小組」。¹³²為回應這一動作，中共中央統戰部就不應該再接待流亡西藏代表團，因為這樣做可能會給外界造成一種錯覺即中共僅僅是在搞「統戰」，說服國際社會它是仁慈的。相反，中國政府應該給現在由中共統戰部、公安部門及外交部官員組成的工作小組改名為西藏委員會，或另外組織一個專門處理該問題的委員會。此外還應該擴大除達賴喇嘛代表以外的流亡西藏的官員來中國訪問之外的交流活動範圍。除了西藏流亡人士對中國不定期的訪問和與中國官員會面還可以制度化為每年舉行一次論壇的形式，還可以組織一個教育和文化工作小組，並可以在佛學院校與其他公立學校之間建立交換課程等。¹³³

為推動問題的解決，北京需要幫助西藏流亡政府創造一個政治空間使其能夠同中共給談判下的前提條件相適應，比如幫助其承認西藏的不可分割性。如果中國強調西藏是其不可分割的一部分這一前提對處理西藏問題的重要性，西藏流亡政府就可以重新認真考慮對這一前提是否接受。例如，雙方可以在將西藏問題定位為一個歷史問題上達成共識。¹³⁴中國堅持要流亡領袖承認西藏一直都是中國的一部份，¹³⁵但西藏流亡政府頂住壓力依然認為「西藏一直都是一個獨立的國家。」 ¹³⁶然而最近，桑東仁波切（Samdhong Rinpoche）說從1640年至1951年的西藏政府就是中國的一個地方政府而不是一個國家政府。¹³⁷這是在歷史問題認識上的有益轉向。

上世紀50年代，中國領導人迫切要求中國人民同大漢族主義鬥爭。¹³⁸從那以後，在少數民族地區多集中於對「地方民族主義」的對抗。¹³⁹要重建西藏地區的和平與穩定，政府可以資助一些教育項目使那些在藏的外族移民能夠接受有關西藏文化成就的教育。如同香港正在策劃制定的反種族歧視法案一樣，¹⁴⁰制定這樣一部法律同樣可以來緩解種族間的緊張，而且在反就業歧視方面也能發揮重要作用。即使是一部強制性法律也依然不能改變西藏各民族人民的勞動分工，但是一部強制性法律能使那藏族或有「老家」關係的求職者佔有優勢。 ¹⁴¹

在西藏，藏族人從來沒有擔任過中共西藏自治區委員會的書記。那也許是與傳統有關，從封建主義皇朝開始就不在當地錄用最高級官員。然而，現在卻有例外，2003年, 在全部六十二個省長和黨委書記裡面，有18個是在他們出生地的所在省裡面任職。¹⁴²由於在西藏還沒有藏族的黨委書記，許多人就認為北京政府不信任任何藏族人有能力並能忠誠的履行黨委書記的職責。不可否認的是，藏族人是完全能夠勝任的：現在在全部198名中共中央委員會委員中就有6人是藏族人。¹⁴³藏族人擔任西藏自治區的黨委書記將被視為中共信任藏族人領導西藏的一個信號。

常有人說漢人在西藏發展中比西藏人受惠更多。¹⁴⁴這不足為奇，因漢人偏愛於城市地區而大量聚集，但大部份藏族人是農民或牧人。儘管愈來愈多的西藏人移居到城市，但只要漢人和藏族人在文化程度及工作經驗上存在差距，分工上的種族差異仍然會很大。¹⁴⁵為了改變這種趨勢，在經濟上應當擴大優惠政策並將其延伸到私營部門以使藏族人受惠。

在馬來西亞，廣泛的扶持行動促進種族間更大得平等並減少了種族緊張的情況：1970年，馬來亞人擁有2.4%的法人財產，但到2003年卻達到了20%；同時，華人和印度人種所佔法人財產也上升到30%——40%。並且人均國民收入也由1970年的RM1,132躍升到2003年的RM13,683。¹⁴⁶中國官方媒體對馬來西亞採取這些種族支持行動所取得的良好結果也給予了肯定評價。 ¹⁴⁷

政府還可以限制移民到西藏。國際上限制甚至禁止移民到少數民族地區的情況也並不罕見的：如印度禁止「印度大陸的居民」遷移到那加蘭邦，克什米爾和安達曼群島和尼科巴群島；越南禁止「自發遷移」到少數民族聚居的中央高地。¹⁴⁸為了讓藏族人成為西藏經濟發展的中堅力量，他們需要更高水平技能。但藏族兒童一般都被充作家庭勞動力，所以對教育提不起很高的興趣，這在農村更是如此。¹⁴⁹對此，政府可以支付給上學的西藏兒童以與其在家勞動所能得到的收入一樣的薪金。這些支出是值得的，因為要讓大多數藏族人富起來只能靠大幅度的提高他們的受教育水平。十年前，英國的北愛爾蘭地區是經濟相對滯後的地區，但今天它卻比「英國本土」擁有比更好的學校，更好的醫療保健，以及更多的文化勝地。通過政府財政補貼、公平就業法案、扶持行動、擴大教育機會和接受天主教教育以培養人人向上的精神，英屬阿爾斯特地區同愛屬阿爾斯特地區之間的差距正逐漸縮小。¹⁵⁰

一些人權組織已經表示對1996年開始執行的關於在西藏自治區內禁止公開展示達賴喇嘛的照片的禁令的關注。這一禁令沒有在其他藏族人聚居地區如青海、甘肅、四川和雲南等地推行，¹⁵¹而且並沒有出現不良後果，這證明在不對分離主義妥協的情況下，公開展示宗教物品是可以被容許的。1987年頒布了一部規定西藏語為西藏自治區官方用語的臨時性法案，同時法案還規定有要求官員學習西藏語的條款。¹⁵²相類似的規定也在中國其他藏族自治區域發佈。¹⁵³但大體上這些法律規範都未被執行。2002年通過的永久自治區語言法是否也會如此現在還不明朗。¹⁵⁴但同時一些在自治區任職的漢族官員正接受西藏語的培訓，¹⁵⁵對西藏語的重視似乎實踐著要加強西藏自治的新承諾。

國際法認可國家有懲罰分裂主義的權力，但這些懲罰必須適當。在中國其它地方，虐待囚犯有時要面臨嚴重的後果。¹⁵⁶但在西藏似乎很罕見，儘管有許多關於酷刑的可信報導，¹⁵⁷但是對虐待囚犯的人的嚴厲懲罰會減小對分離主義分子的同情。

當前國際社會趨向以和平對話的方式作為解決西藏問題的方法。展開對話的國際環境是成熟的。美國政府已經承認西藏是中國的一部分，布什總統也在很多場合都敦促中國盡快同達賴喇嘛進行對話。與達賴喇嘛展開對話能夠削減西方議會對中國政府的批評並有利於向外界傳達中國政府對西藏問題的良好祈願。

隨著中國國力的壯大，所謂的西藏問題不將再威脅中國的國家安全；達賴喇嘛針對西藏的歷史和地位問題所作的一系列的動作和聲明也為和平解決西藏問題提供了保證。2005年春，台灣兩黨對中國的訪問將進一步緩和台海緊張局勢，並將打開和平對話之門。世界其他地區例如在印度尼西亞政府和亞奇獨立武裝組織之間，以色列和新巴勒斯坦領導人之間都在為和平而努力，這都加強了用對話來解決看似難以解決的衝突的國際趨勢。

當達賴喇嘛正採用壓制和勸誘方法保證西藏青年議會的行為不脫離其新的自治要求時，要讓其有新動作就要看北京領導人特別是胡錦濤主席的態度了。如果胡錦濤以他的決心和智慧來處理這一問題，就可以把握住這個與達賴喇嘛直接會談的黃金時機，並作出一些讓步，也許胡錦濤和達賴喇嘛能有一天共同分享諾貝爾和平獎。不管在走向對話和建設和平的道路上如何的艱難險阻，中國和國際社會都應在這一問題上作一些大膽的想像。

（許群峰譯，何包鋼校）

(English version published in Pacific Affair, 2005-6:78)

***** ^^^^^ *****

1 The authors would like to express sincere thanks for the constructive comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees and of Professor Timothy Cheek.

2 何包鋼，澳大利亞迪肯大學國際與政治學院講座教授，主要從事西方政治理論、比較政治學和中國鄉村政治研究。主要著作有《中國民主化》（London & New York, Routledge出版社，1996）、《中國公民社會的民主意義》（London, Macmillan出版社，1997）、《民族主義、民族認同和中國民主化》（合著，Ashgale出版社，2000）、《尋找民主與權威的平衡》（合著，華中師範大學出版社）、《亞洲多元文化》（合編，Oxford University出版社，2005）。沙伯力，香港科技大學教授，國際公認的藏學專家。

3 “Dalai Lama interviewd on Taiwan visit, cross-Strait ties, US role,” Lien Ho Pao, October 2, 2000, in British Broadcasting Corp/Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC/SWB), October 7, 2000, Lexis-Nexis (LN) database.

4 “Five-point peace plan for Tibet: address to members of the US Congress, September 21, 1987,” Office of Tibet, New York, www.tibetoffice.org; site last accessed 14 November 2005.

5 “Statement by His Holiness, the XIV Dalai Lama on his visit to the United States, September, 1995,” Government of Tibet in Exile, www.tibet.com/DL/hhus95.html, site last accessed 14 November 2005. T.C. Tethong, former minister of Information and International Relations of the Tibet Government-in-Exile (1996-2001), said “The Tibetan people know that we are different. We have our own language, and own race and history are separate from that of the Chinese.” See “Op-ed piece from T.C. Tethong on Tibetan cultural week,” World Tibet Network (WTN), September 14, 2002, http://www.tibet.ca/ en/wtnarchive/2002/9/14_3.html; site last accessed 5 December 2005.

6 “China must listen to the Dalai Lama, Tibetan exile spokesman says,” Agence France Presse (AFP), March 18, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/3/18_1.html; site last accessed on 5 December 2005 (quoting TGIE spokesman’s statement that “In return for genuine autonomy for the six million Tibetan people, His Holiness is willing to have Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China”).

7 “Tibetan government now wants autonomous status, talks with China,” Press Trust of India, May 22, 2001, LN.

8 Laurence Brahm, “Conciliatory Dalai Lama expounds on winds of change,” South China Morning Post (SCMP), March 14, 2005, A4, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/ 2005/3/18_1.html; cite last accessed on 5 December 2005.

9 Sandip Roy, “Will Dalai Lama follow brother’s Tibet visit,” Pacific News Service, August 27, 2002, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/8/29_6.html; Tenzin Namgyal, “Flashbacks and flashbulbs,” Tibetan Bulletin 5:1 (Jan.-Feb. 2001), http://www.tibet.net/ tibbul/0101/last.html. The EP, of course, cannot “recognize” a country, as foreign policy is the domain of the individual EU states.

10 “Tibet settlement hopeful in Dalai Lama’s lifetime: exiled prime minister,” AFP, July 5, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/7/5_1.html, cite last accessed on 5 December 2005. Samdhong Rinpoche has said China now considers the Dalai Lama part of the solution, not part of the problem. Also see Tashi Ragbey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlo, Sino-Tibetan dialogue in the post-Mao era: lessons and prospects (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), pp. 28-29 and fn. 50, who identify the first generation of Tibetan communists and senior military officers of the PRC’s 18th Army in Tibet as wanting negotiations with the Dalai Lama. They refer to a “recent document circulating among Party officials [that] states, ‘anyone who thinks the Tibet issue should be dragged on until after the death of the fourteenth Dalai Lama is naïve, unwise, and [supporting] the wrong policy.’” They note as well that “The document argues that it is in China’s long-term strategic interest to resolve the issue in dialogue with the current exiled Tibetan leader, and that it must do so while the historic opportunity still exists,” a viewpoint with supporters among centrist reformers in Beijing.

11 “Exiled Tibetan leaders to discuss autonomous state with China,” Japan Economic Newswire, March 14, 2005, LN.

12 “Tibet settlement hopeful . . .” AFP, July 5, 2005.

13 Chinese, Tibetans hold first talks outside China,” Indo-Asian News Service, July 3, 2005, LN.

14 Central Tibetan Administration, “The statement of the special envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Lodi G. Gyari, head of Tibetan delegation which met Chinese representatives in Berne, Switzerland,” Tibetan Bulletin 9:4 (July-August, 2005), http://www.tibet.net/tibbul/2003/0303/special1.html, cite last accessed on 5 December 2005.

15 “We have to accept ground realities,” Outlook (India), March 19, 2005, http://www.tibet. net/tibbul/2005/0506/interview2.html, cite last accessed on 5 December 2005 (interview with Samdhong Rinpoche).

16 See N. Bhanutej, “Mantra of freedom: cutting a new path,” The Week (India), April 18, 2005 (quoting pro-independence writer and activist Tenzin Tsundue’s criticism of the Dalai Lama’s support for a railway under construction in Tibet); Jeffrey Bowe, “Has the Dalai Lama made the final surrender?” Times of Tibet, March 14, 2005, www.timesoftibet.com, site last accessed November 29, 2005 (veteran British Tibet independence activist criticizes the Dalai Lama for consigning Tibetans to “a dangerous and uncertain fate”); “Say it ain’t so,” The Gazette (Montreal), March 16, 2005:A28 (newspaper editorial criticizing the Dalai Lama’s “surrender”).

17 “India’s position on Tibet unchanged,” TibetNet, April 14, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/ wtnarchive/2005/4/14_3.html, site last accessed on 5 December 2005.

18 “Tibet Settlement Hopeful . . .”AFP, July 5, 2005; “Rinpoche seeks full-fledged autonomy for Tibet,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), September 3, 2005, http://www.tribuneindia. com/2005/20050903/ himachal.htm, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

19 See Barry Sautman, “China’s vulnerability to ethnic minority separatism in Tibet,” Asian Affairs: an American Review 31:2 (2005), pp. 87-118.

20 Zhu Yuchao and Dongyan Blachford, “Ethnic minority issues in China’s foreign policy: perspectives and implications,” Pacific Review 18:2 (2005), pp. 243-264.

21 “Dalai Lama ‘has a keen desire to visit China,’” Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), November 4, 2004, LN.

22 A.A. Shiromany, ed., The Political Philosophy of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings (New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Center, 1998), p. 144.

23 “Indian defense minister hopes China will begin dialogue with Dalai Lama,” Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 1 (January-April 2002), p. 9.

24 “China again says no to dialogue with Dalai Lama,” Associated Press, 15 July 2002, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/7/15_2.html, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

25 “Hu Jintao vows to ‘crush Tibetans,’” Tibetan Bulletin 5:3 (July-August 2001), p. 10.

26 H.S. Nanda, “Terrorism puts Tibet on back burner,” United Press International, March 11, 2004, LN; Suresh Kr Pramar, “Mellowing of Dalai Lama,” Asian Tribune, July 22, 2004, http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=10489, site last accessed 5 December 2005; Nachammai Raman, “’Free Tibet’ push fades as India-China ties warm,” Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 2005, p. 7.

27A Look at the Changing Face of Tibet,” Cable News Network, September 15, 2003, LN; D. Pattanayak, “Watch your step, Mr. Prime Minister,” The Statesman (India), June 23, 2003, LN.

28 Ragbey and Shahlo, 2004, p. 26 (discussing “unprecedented affluence” of Tibetans who work for government); see also the statement of Tibetologist Robbie Barnett that middle class Tibetans’ incomes are increasing rapidly and “they have very good lives,” www.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/newmedia/ masters/tibetan/politics.html and Barry Sautman, “The new Tibetan middle class.” Paper presented at International Conference of Asian Scholars, August 2003, Singapore.

29 “Danish Premier tells Dalai Lama Tibet policy will not change,” Dansmarks Radio, 6 June 2003, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, June 6, 2003, LN.

30 “EU ups stakes in lifting of China arms embargo,” Guardian, May 13, 2005, p. 1.

31 Amy Kellam, “Foreign devils: law’s imperial discourse and the status of Tibet,” Griffith Law Review 12:2 (2003), pp.190-214; “Britain wants China to grant Tibet freedoms,” Reuters, October 20, 1999, in WTN, October 21, 1999, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/1999 /10/21_1.html, site last accessed on 5 December 2005.

32 Gyaneshwar Chaturvedi, “India’s Tibet policy,” Tibetan Bulletin 9:1 (Jan-Feb 2005):7-11; “No change in India’s Tibet policy, ‘right direction’ on Sikkim – Vajpayee,” AFX – Asia, 27 June 2003, LN.

33 “China-India relations ‘cannot be normalized without addressing the Tibetan issue: Samdhong Rinpoche: an interview,” Tibetan Bulletin, 7:3 (May-Aug 2003), p. 24.

34 “Pragmatic India shakes hands with Israelis-Palestinians, China-Tibet,” DPA, September 8, 2003, LN.

35 “Exiled Tibetan government banks on Sino-Indian talks,” AFP, 25 June 2003, http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=4427&t=1&c=1, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

36 Austin Ramzy, “Tibetans fear for their future after the Dalai Lama,” http://journalism. berkeley.edu/ projects/greaterchina/story-tibetans, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

37 “Vatican keeps Dalai Lama meeting low key,” SCMP, 29 November 2003: A8, LN.

38 Zhongguoshibao, 17 November 2000, p. 14.

39 Liang Yufang, “Dalai bu paichu jishen zhong Lianhe Bao, 3 April 2001.

40 “Dalai Lama will not be reincarnated in occupied Tibet,” Tibetan Bulletin 5:5 (Nov-Dec 2001), p. 8, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/1/10_1.html, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

41 “After the Dalai Lama, who?” Times of India, 21 March 2004, http://www.tibet.ca/en/ wtnarchive/2004/3/22_2.html, site last accessed on 5 December 2005.

42 Melvyn C. Goldstein, “Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question”, Occasional Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 1995, p. xi.

43 June Teufel Dreyer, “Unrest in Tibet”, Current History, 88:539 (1989), p. 284.

44 Ibid, p. 48.

45 For a detailed discussion on the Dalai Lama’s original autonomy proposal, see Baogang He, “Why Does Beijing Reject the Dalai Lama Autonomy Proposal?” Review of Asian and Pacific Studies (Seikei University, Japan), no. 22 (2001), pp. 57-72.

46 Dalai Lama, “March 10 Statement 1992,” in Shiromany, 1998, pp. 434-436.

47 “His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains his position on China’s preconditions,” Tibet Bulletin 7:4 (Sept-Oct 2003), p. 25.

48 This followed the international workshop on Tibetan autonomy in November 1999 in New Delhi in India.

49 Baogang He’s interview with Lodi Gyari and Bhuchung Tsering in Washington on 23 July, 31 July, 7 August 2003, with Lodi Gyari in Singapore on 25 March 2004.

50 “Conciliatory Dalai Lama . . .”. Subsequent letters to the editor of SCMP from Kate Saunders, International Campaign for Tibet communications director, and Thubten Samphel, Secretary, TGIE Department of Information & International Relations, did not dispute the accuracy of Brahm’s report the Dalai Lama’s statements. The Samphel letter did state that the Dalai Lama believed his statements to Brahm were part of a private audience, not a press interview. “Tibet’s autonomy stance,” SCMP, March 19, 2005:A14; Thubten Samphel, “Letter to the Editor, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong,” March 29, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/3/30_2.html, cite last accessed 5 December 2005. Alison Reynolds, director of the Free Tibet Campaign, UK, also did not deny the

accuracy of Brahm’s quotes, but said that the Dalai Lama “was keen to re-emphasise aspects that the Chinese could be responsive to.” Richard Spencer, “Dalai Lama offers China a settlement over Tibet,” Daily Telegraph, March 15, 2005, p. 12. Brahm termed his encounter with the Dalai Lama as a “private meeting”and implied the latter sought to use it to convey a message to PRC leaders.

51 “China opens Tibet doors,” Indian Express, June 24, LN.

52 Jasper Becker, “China paves the way for possible return of the Dalai Lama,” Independent, September 24, 2002, p. 30.

53 “Dalai Lama demands true autonomy for Tibet,” AFP, October 7, 2004, LN; “Dalai Lama says remaining in China in Tibet’s interest,” PTI, December 2, 2004, LN.

54 Samdhong Rinpoche, Tibet: A Future Vision (New Delhi: Tibetan Parlimentary and Policy Research Centre, 1997), p. 47.

55 Carole McGranahan, “Empire and the status of Tibet: British, Chinese and Tibetan negotiations,” in Alex McKay (ed.), The History of Tibet (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 267-295.

56 Tsering Shakya, A History of modern Tibet since 1947 (London: Pimilico 1999), p. 62.

57 “Excerpt from ICJ interview with the Dalai Lama,” in International Commission of Jurists, Tibet: human rights and the law (Geneva: ICJ 1997), pp. 349-350.

58 Luke Harding, “China meets Dalai Lama’s envoys,” Guardian, May 28, 2003, p. 11.

59 D.S. Rajan, “Beijing and the Dalai Lama: ice melting?” South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper No. 1271 (February 28, 2005), http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers13%5 Cpaper1271.html, site last accessed 5 December 2005; Cai Yongmei, “Fangcai duli yu xizang weilai” (Abandoning independence and Tibet’s future), Kaifeng (August 2003), http://www.open. com. hk/4j.html, cite last accessed 5 December 2005.

60 Liaowang Xizang, No. 4, 2003, p. 13.

61 “His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains . . .,” 2003.

62 Ken Gewertz, “Panel examines Beijing/Dalai Lama negotiations,” Harvard Gazette, 4 December 2003, http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.04/13-negotiate.html, site last accessed, 5 December 2005.

63 “Commentary: Dalai Lama’s ‘autonomy’ claim hypocritical,” Xinhua, 1 September 2005, http://en.tibet.cn/forum/tad/t20050908_54001.htm, site last accessed 5 December 2005; “6.4b yuan worth of projects approved in Tibet,” SCMP, May 31, 2005:6.

64 Rabgey & Sharlho 2004, p. 37. Language and family planning policies evince such coordination, as does the distribution of Five Provinces and Regions Tibetan language textbooks. Ashild Kolas and Monika Thowsen, On the margins of Tibet: cultural survival on the Sino-Tibetan frontier (Seattle: University of Washington), pp. 114-116.

65 “Sichuan to exempt ethnic regions from agricultural taxes,” Business Daily Update, 12 March 2004, http://english.people.com.cn/200403/11/eng20040311_137233.shtml, site accessed on 5 December 2005.

66 Samdhong Rinpoche, Tibet: A Future Vision, p. 52.

67 Cai 2003.

68 “Tibetans begin talks with China for autonomy,” Star of Mysore, August 8, 2005, http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=10402&article=UN+is+'USELESS'%3A+Tibetan+PM, site last accessed 5 December 2005 (Samdhong Rinpoche: objective of talks with China is “to make the Tibetan plateau an Ahimsa [non-violence] zone, after which, there will be no need for defense forces”); “In exile, they keep their fingers crossed,”Indian Express, June 24, 2003 (Tibetan parliament in exile seeks zone of peace), LN; “Tibetans seek to broaden support base at anti-globalisation forum,” AFP, January 20, 2004, http://studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?id=170, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

69 Tibetan Bulletin, no.11-12, 2003, p. 4.

70 Barry Sautman & Lo Shiu-hing, The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1995).

71 TGIE, “Statement by special envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the delegation sent by his Holiness the Dalai Lama to China,” http://www.tibet.com/NewsRoom/delegation2.htm, site last accessed, 5 December 2005.

72 “Talks progressing, says Tibet’s PM-in-Exile,” The Nation [Bangkok], March 14, 2005, http://www.un.or.th/ohchr/news/2005/DailyNewsBulletin/3/p, site last accessed 5 December 2005; S.N.M. Abdi, “Hardliners reject softer stance by Dalai Lama,” SCMP, March 15, 2005:9, http://www.un.or.th/ohchr/news/2005/DailyNewsBulletin/3/e, site last accessed 5 December 2005; “Kashag’s urgent appeal to the Tibetan people & Tibet supporters in the USA and Canada,” WTN, September 6, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/ 9/6_1.html, site last accessed 5 December 2005. The TGIE still refuses to criticize demonstrations that occur, however. See Albert Amateau, The Villager (New York), March 3, 2005, in WTN, March 3, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/ 3/3_4.html, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

73 “His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains . . . p. 24.

74 Lodi Gyari’s question to He Baogong, 31 July 2003, Washington, D.C.

75 “Commentary: no more playing Tibet as ‘card’ for leaving Tibetans alone,” Xinhua, July 26, 2004, http://www.friends-of-tibet.org.nz/news/september_2004_update_19.htm, site last accessed 5 December 2005. http://www.tibet.net/flash/2004/1004/131004.htm

76 Xizang Liaowang, no. 5, 2003, p. 4.

77 “Statement by Special Envoy Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation to China,”

http://www.tibet.net/flash/2004/1004/131004.html, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

78 “The sect with two heads,” Economist 331:7858 (9 April 1994), pp. 40-42; Barry Searak, “Lama’s escape inflames Buddhist rivalry,” New York Times, February 3, 2000, p. A1. The Tibetan exiles’ apparent order of preference is 1. the Dalai Lama dies in Tibet and is reincarnated there; 2. he dies outside China and is reincarnated there; and 3. the reincarnation system ends. For some PRC hardliners, the order is reversed.

79 Lobsang Wangyal,“Tibetan activists hold onto hope as Dalai Lama marks 45 years in exile,” AFP, March 10, 2004, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2004/3/9_5.html, site last accessed 5 December 2005.

80 Baogang He’s interview with Lodi Gyari and Bhuchung Tseing in Washington on 23 July, 31 July, 7 August 2003, with Lodi Gyari in Singapore on 25 March 2004. For a detailed analysis of different concepts of autonomy, see Baogang He, “Minority Rights with Chinese Characteristics”, in Will Kymlicka and Baogang He, eds., Multiculturalism in Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 56-79; a philosophical approach to the issue see Baogang He, “Confucianism versus Liberalism over Minority Rights: A Critical Responses to Will Kymlicka”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 103-123.

81 Quoted in Lodi Gyari, “Don’t Shut out the Dalai Lama”, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 20, 2000, p. 28.

82 Becker, 2002.

83 Lodi Gyari, quoted in “A look at the changing face of Tibet,” CNN, September 15, 2003, LN

84 John Gittings, “Cultural clash in land on the roof of the world,” Guardian, February 8, 2002, p. 17.

85 SCMP, May 31, 2005; Minnie Chan,“Beijing pledges to continue selection method for next Dalai Lama,”SCMP, July 19, 2005, LN.

86 See Robert Barnett, “Beyond the collaborator-martyr model: strategies of compliance, opportunism and opposition within Tibet,” in Barry Sautman and June Dreyer (eds.), Contemporary Tibet: politics, development and society in a disputed region (Armonk: ME Sharpe, forthcoming December, 2005); Anonymous, “Tibetan cadres today: collaborators or patriots?” Tibet Press Watch vol. 10, no. 4(July, 2002), pp. 6-7.

87 See, e.g., the statement of Raidi, the former TAR executive deputy secretary, who advised the Dalai Lama to “Make some clear choices, and not have at his side those who advocate and incite Tibetan independence with their actions, nor be surrounded by bone-dry Tibetan independence elements.” “Tibet leader says China opposes collusion of Taiwan, Tibet separatists,” Xinhua, March 14, 2001, http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/oasien/china/service/bbc/010317.txt, cite last accessed on 5 December 2005.

88 Exile leaders are aware of the negative effects of at least some such mobilizational efforts. “Tibetans urged not to mar Hu Jintao’s America visit,” TibetNet, in WTN, September 5, 2005 (Samdhong Rinpoche states that “Over aggressive agitations like burning the national flag of China will achieve no more than further hardening and alienating the attitude of Chinese leaders”). The PRC government has in turn stated with respect to exile claims that “A person who is pure-hearted in seeking compromise certainly will not sling mud on the other part, while an attempt to win international interference on an internal affair is an obvious denial of the framework that Tibet is part of China.” “Dalai Lama’s ‘autonomy’ claim hypocritical,” Xinhua, September 1, 2005.

89 Frank Ching, “Hong Kong Solution for Tibet?” Far Eastern Economic Review vol. 161, no. 31 (July 30, 1998), p. 37.

90 “Chinese Premier Presses U.S. on Taiwan, Trade; Wen Addresses Wide Range of Issues,” Washington Post, 23 November 2003, p. A01.

91 See, e.g., “China strongly opposes US presidential report on Tibet issue,” PTI, April 24, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/4/24_3.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

92 Baogang He’s interviews with TGIE ministers, November 1999, New Delhi, India.

93 Samphel, 2005.

94 “His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains . . .” p. 25.

95 “Dalai zai Yindu Daijile” (Dalai Lama at Darjeeling, India), Renmin Ribao, 3 March 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68/11461/1034418.html, cite last accessed 8 December 2005.

96 The Political Philosophy, p. 60.

97 “Chinese offer ‘not genuine,’” Tribune News Service (India), February 4, 2002, in WTN, February 5, 2002, .tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2002/2/5_2.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

98 Richard Baum, “Britain’s ‘betrayal’ of Hong Kong: a second look,” Journal of Contemporary China 8:20 (March, 1999), pp. 9-28.

99 “A breakthrough on Tibet?” Boston Globe, July 2, 1998:A18; Interview by Barry Sautman, with a Tibet-specialist UFWD official, Beijing, December 26, 2004.

100 “His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains . . . 2003, p. 24.

101 “China opposes Dalai Lama’s political activities overseas – spokesman,” Xinhua June 14, 2005 (PRC Foreign Ministry statement), http://english.people.com.cn/200506/14/ archive.html, cite last accessed 8 December 2005; “China’s top legislator, Danish parliament speaker discuss ties, Tibet,” Xinhua, June 2, 2004, LN (statement of Wu Bangguo, Politburo Standing Committee member). Although former president Jiang Zemin first made the pre-condition explicit in 1998, in response to the Dalai Lma’s first visit to Taiwan, it was an implicit demand from much earlier. See “Attitudes to possible return of Dalai Lama,” Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong], August 11, 1983, in BBC/SWB, August 12, 1983, LN (PRC high cadres state that the Dalai Lama can return to live in Beijing or Tibet, but if he does so “this means that he willingly supports the reunification of the motherland and the unity of all nationalities”).

102 “Dalai Lama opposes independence for Taiwan,” DPA, July 17, 1998, LN.

103 “Dalai Lama’s strategy for China talks explained,” Lien Ho Pao [Taipei], 28 October 1998, p. 13, in BBC/ SWB, November 9, 1998, LN.

104 “Dalai Lama shuns Tibet independence,” The Advertiser [Australia], June 29, 2000, p. 30.

105 “China must listen to the Dalai Lama, Tibetan exile spokesman says,” AFP, March 18, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2005/3/18_1.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

106 Tibetan Youth Congress “Boycott Made in China,” http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/ bmic.htm, TYC, “No Olympics 2008 in Beijing,” http://www.torontotyc.com/olympics.htm, sites last accessed 8 December 2005.

107 “Message from the Dalai Lama’s eldest brother, Prof. Thubten Norbu,” http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?list=type&type=34, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

108 Pawan Sharma, “Drive to boycott Chinese goods being re-launched,” Hindustan Times, 13 December 2002, http://www.friendsoftibet.org/mediaonfot/20021213.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

109 TYC, “Tibetan Youth Leadership Training Program,” http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/ tyltp2004.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

110 “Young Tibet up in Arms,” The Statesman (India), 4 July 2003, http://www.tibetanyouth.org/cgi-bin/webland/guestbook/guestbook.pl?type=view, site last accessed 8 December 2005; S.N.M. Abdi, “Hardliners reject softer stance by Dalai Lama,” SCMP, 15 March 2005, p. 9.

111 Tsering Tashi, “SFT mark Nobel Prize conferment on the Dalai Lama,” December 12, 2004, http://www.timesoftibet.com/articles/108/1/SFT-mark-Nobel-Prize-conferment-on-the-Dalai-Lama, site last accessed 8 December 2005 (Dalai Lama’s London Office of Tibet reports positively pro-independence statement); Brian Marple, “Protestors, welcomers converge on Chinese leader’s arrival in New York,” September 14, 2005, http://www.tibet.ca/en/ wtnarchive/2005/9/14-2_1.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005 (SFT leader states “What we need is an end to the CCP”).

112 Erkin Alptekin, “Freedom for Tibet: Europe speaks out, Berlin, March 12, 2005,”

www.tibet10march.net/web/redner_alptekin_en.htm, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

113 Baogang He’s interview with Lodi Gyari in Washington on 31 July 2003.

114 “Address of Mr. Kelsang Gyaltsen Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 5 (Nov-Dec 2003), p. 18.

115 Orville Schell, “Chinese Puzzle - Why won't Beijing make peace with the Dalai Lama?” San Francisco Chronicle, 24 June 2001; http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/2001/ 6/26_3.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

116 John K. Knaus, “China’s opportunity to resolve Tibet issue,” Boston Globe, December 8, 2003, p. A13.

117 Gyaltsen, 2003, p. 18.

118 Lodi Gyari, “Don’t shut out the Dalai Lama”, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 20, 2000, p.

119 Nicholas Rufford, “Tibet’s brothers in arms spoil for a fight,” Gazette (Montreal), November 21, 1999, p. A11 (Dalai Lama’s youngest brother states “The Chinese only understand the language of violence. So why not give it a shot?” and advocates bombings in Beijing).

120 Tibet Observer, no. 4, 2003, p. 13.

121 “Dalai Lama calls on George Bush,” Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7 no. 4, Sep-Oct 2003, p. 35.

122 “After the Dalai Lama, who?” Times of India, 21 March 2004, http://www.tibet.ca/en/ wtnarchive/2004/3/22_2.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

123 “Kashag shuts down Budapest Office of Tibet,” Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 2 (Mar/April 2005), http://www.tibet.net/tibbul/2005/0304/newsbrief.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

124 Rebecca French, “A conversation with Tibetans? Reconsidering the relationship between religious beliefs and secular legal discourse,” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 26, no. 1 (2001), pp. 95-114.

125 Julian Gearing, “Wrangling hinders talks with Beijing,” SCMP, 12 December 2003, p. 15; Jane Ardley, “Learning the art of democracy? Continuity and change in the Tibetan government-in-exile,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 3 (2003):349-363.

126 Samdhong Rinpoche, “Non-violent Struggle: Tibet’s Legacy to Freedom Struggle,” Tibetan Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 5 (Jan-Apr 2002), p. 16.

127 In 1999, the Tibetan exile officials rejected a gradual strategy suggested by Baogang He because they thought it meant accepting China’s rule, acceding to China’s legitimacy and confirming China’s framework. They insisted that no concession could be made before negotiations.

128 “Dalai Lama’s Tibet hopes,” Toronto Star, 23 April 2004, p. A04.

129 Beijing now emphasizes that the Dalai Lama should support China’s Western Development Project, including the building of the railway to Tibet that will begin operation by 2007. He has however connected it with “cultural genocide” and stated that “In general, a railway link is very useful in order to develop, but not when politically motivated to bring about demographic change.“ ”Dalai Lama brands Chinese rail link ‘cultural genocide,” Associated Press (AP), 11 September 2005, http://www.un.or.th/ohchr /SR/News/2005/DailyNewsBulletin/9/PRC2, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

130 “Dalai Lama’s Tibet hopes,” 2004.

131 The Third International Conference of Tibet Support groups, held in Berlin in 2000, declared it would take active measures to encourage the TGIE to consider the independence option if Beijing refuses to talk with the Dalai Lama. Tibetan Bulletin, May-June 2000, p. 9.

132 The ten member Task Force has its own office and includes Kashag (cabinet) members. Rajan, 2005.

133 Baogang He’s interview with Lodi Gyari in Singapore on 25 March 2004.

134 Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China conflict: history and polemics (Washington: East-West Center, 2004).

135 “Dalai Lama spokesman: Tibet’s former independence can’t be changed,’” AP, June 29, 1998, LN.

136 T.C. Tethong, in Nidhi Singh, “How the Bodhi Dharma Returned to India,” India Currents, June, 2001, www.friends-of-tibet.org.nz/news/june_2001_update_9.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

137 [Canada] Joint Meeting . . . , 2004.

138 Dangdai Zhongguo minzu gongzuo [Contemporary China’s ethnic work](Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1993), p. 106.

139 See, e.g., Chen Kuiyuan "On the understanding of several questions concerning socialist spiritual civilization" Xizang Ribao, August 13, 1996, in BBC/SWB, September 16, 1996, LN.

140 Hong Kong Home Affairs Bureau, Legislating against racial discrimination: a consultation paper (2004), http://sc.info.gov.hk/gb/www.hab.gov.hk/en/policy_responsibilities/the_rights_of_the_individuals/public_consultation.htm, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

141 Hu Xiaojiang, The little shops of Lhasa, Tibet: migrant businesses and the formation of markets in a transitional economy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2005), Ch. 4.

142 Li Cheng, “Analysis of Current Provincial Leaders,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 7 (Summer, 2003), p. 13.

143 Li Cheng & Lynn White III, “The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu gets what?” Asian Survey, vol. 43, no. 4 (2003), pp. 553-597.

144 Tibetan Commission on Human Rights & Development, Impoverishing Tibetans: China’s Flawed Economic Policy in Tibet (Dharamsala: TCHRD, 2000).

145 Andrew Fischer, “Urban Fault Lines in Shangri-la: Population and Economic Foundations of Inter-ethnic Conflict in the Tibetan Areas of Western China” (London: Development Studies Institute, 2004); Andrew Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet: challenges of recent economic growth (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2005).

146 Eddie Toh, “M’sia Steps up Plans to Attain Bumiputra Goal,” Business Times (Singapore), 27 September 2004, LN; Felipe Salvosa, “Mahathir Stresses Economic Gains of Affirmative Action,” Business World (Manila), 6 October 2004:1, LN; Jeyakumar Devaraj, “Has Malaysia Really Eradicated Poverty?” Aliran Monthly, no. 2 (2004), http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2004a/2j.html, site last accessed 8 December 2005.

147 “Mahathir highlights equity in economic growth,” Xinhua, 5 October 2004, http://english.people.com